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In non-stationary environments, there is a conﬂict between exploiting currently favored
options and gaining information by exploring lesser-known options that in the past have
proven less rewarding. Optimal decision-making in such tasks requires considering future
states of the environment (i.e., planning) and properly updating beliefs about the state
of the environment after observing outcomes associated with choices. Optimal belief-
updating is reﬂective in that beliefs can change without directly observing environmental
change. For example, after 10s elapse, one might correctly believe that a trafﬁc light last
observed to be red is now more likely to be green.To understand human decision-making
when rewards associated with choice options change over time, we develop a variant of
the classic “bandit” task that is both rich enough to encompass relevant phenomena and
sufﬁciently tractable to allow for ideal actor analysis of sequential choice behavior.We eval-
uate whether people update beliefs about the state of environment in a reﬂexive (i.e., only
in response to observed changes in reward structure) or reﬂective manner. In contrast to
purely “random” accounts of exploratory behavior, model-based analyses of the subjects’
choices and latencies indicate that people are reﬂective belief updaters. However, unlike
the Ideal Actor model, our analyses indicate that people’s choice behavior does not reﬂect
consideration of future environmental states. Thus, although people update beliefs in a
reﬂective manner consistent with the Ideal Actor, they do not engage in optimal long-term
planning, but instead myopically choose the option on every trial that is believed to have
the highest immediate payoff.
Keywords: decision making, reinforcement learning, Ideal Actor, Ideal Observer, POMDP , exploration, exploitation,
planning
INTRODUCTION
Effective decision-making often requires a delicate balance of
exploratory and exploitative behavior. For example, consider the
problem of choosing where to dine out from a set of competing
options.Thequalityofrestaurantschangesovertimesuchthatone
cannot be certain which restaurant is currently best. In this non-
stationary environment, one either chooses the best-experienced
restaurant so far (i.e., exploit) or visits a restaurant that was infe-
riorinthepastbutnowmaybesuperior(i.e.,explore).Theactions
a diner should take in a series of choices is a non-trivial problem
as optimal decision-making requires factoring in the uncertainty
of the environment and the impact of the current action on one’s
future understanding of restaurant quality.
How humans and artiﬁcial agents balance and structure
exploratory and exploitative actions is an important topic in rein-
forcement learning (RL) research (Sutton and Barto,1998; Cohen
et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2011). Exploring when one should exploit
and, conversely, exploiting when one should explore both incur
costs. For example, an actor who excessively exploits will fail to
noticewhenanotheractionbecomessuperior.Conversely,anactor
who excessively explores incurs an opportunity cost by frequently
forgoing the high payoff option.
Indecidingwhethertoexploreorexploit,anagentshouldcon-
sider its uncertainty about the environmental state. In the dining
example above, the agent’s decision to explore or exploit should
dependonthevolatilityof theenvironment(e.g.,therateatwhich
restaurant quality changes over time) and how recently the agent
hasexploredoptionsobservedtobeinferiorinthepast.Forexam-
ple, an agent should exploit when it has recently conﬁrmed that
alternative restaurants remain inferior and the environment is
fairly stable (i.e., restaurant quality does not rapidly change). On
theotherhand,anagentshouldexplorewhenalternativeshavenot
been recently sampled and the environment is volatile. Between
these two extremes lie a host of intermediate cases.
Inthiscontribution,weexaminehowpeopleupdatetheirbelief
states about the relative superiority of actions. In one view, reﬂec-
tive belief updates incorporate predictions of unobserved changes
intheenvironment.Forexample,areﬂectivebelief-updaterwould
be more likely to believe that an inferior restaurant has improved
as time passes since its last visit to the restaurant. In contrast, a
reﬂexive model of choice is only informed by direct observations
of rewards and, therefore, does not fully utilize environmental
structure to update beliefs and guide actions. This distinction
closely echoes contemporary dual-system frameworks of RL in
www.frontiersin.org January 2012 | Volume 2 | Article 398 | 1Knox et al. Belief-directed exploratory choice
which a reﬂexive,computationally parsimonious model-free con-
trollerputativelycompetesforcontrolof behaviorwithareﬂective
and model-based controller (Daw et al., 2005).
For reﬂexive models, exploratory choices are the result of
a purely stochastic decision process. Thus, reﬂexive accounts
do not predict sequential structure in humans’ patterns of
exploratory choice (cf. Otto et al., 2010). Perhaps because of
their simplicity and unexamined intuitions about the “random-
ness”of exploratory behavior,reﬂexive approaches are commonly
adopted to model human behavior (Daw et al., 2006; Wor-
thy et al., 2007; Gureckis and Love, 2009; Pearson et al., 2009;
Jepma and Nieuwenhuis, 2011). Reﬂexive approaches are also
prominent in the design of artiﬁcial agents (Sutton and Barto,
1998).
THE LEAPFROG VARIANT OF THE CLASSIC BANDIT TASK
To understand how people balance exploration and exploitation
given uncertainty about the state of the environment, we devel-
oped a variant of the commonly used n-armed bandit task, as the
restaurant example given above can be formally described. In the
classic n-armed bandit task, there are multiple actions (i.e., ban-
dits) with unknown payoffs associated with them. Crucially, the
payoffs at each time point are not explicitly revealed to decision-
makers but instead must be determined by repeated sampling of
actions. In restless bandit tasks, the actions’ payoffs change over
time, necessitating the aforementioned balancing of exploratory
and exploitive actions.
Previous studies of exploratory choice have utilized n-armed
bandit tasks in which the payoff distributions associated with
the actions noisily drift over the course of decision-making (Daw
et al., 2006; Pearson et al., 2009; Jepma and Nieuwenhuis, 2011).
Although these tasks assess how people behave in changing envi-
ronments, one major drawback of existing tasks is that there is
noaccompanyingformalanalysisof whatdecisionspeopleshould
ideally make. In particular, existing work does not specify a sta-
tistically optimal process for updating estimates of action payoffs,
andtheactionselectionmethodspositedignoretheinformational
value of exploring. The failure of existing tasks to prescribe opti-
mal choice behavior makes it difﬁcult to assess how people differ
fromanoptimalagent.Inpart,theseshortcomingsreﬂectthatfor-
mulating ideal agents for existing tasks is an intractable problem
(e.g.,Daw et al., 2006).
Inthiscontribution,wedevelopanduseanovellaboratorytask
that is sufﬁciently constrained to allow for formal speciﬁcation of
the ideal agent. This formulation will be used to assess human
behavior (e.g., Are people reﬂective or reﬂexive belief updaters?
Do they act optimally given their beliefs?). In our Leapfrog task,
the rewards for two possible actions continually alternate in their
superiority, “leapfrogging” over each other. The underlying state
of the environment – that is, which option currently has the
higher payoff – is only partially observable to the decision-maker.
This class of problems is referred to as a partially observable
Markov decision process (POMDP) in the Artiﬁcial Intelligence
literature (Kaelbling et al., 1998). Choosing the best-observed
action (“exploiting”) generally provides little information about
the underlying state while exploration can resolve the underlying
state but potentially incurs opportunity costs.
An example instantiation of the Leapfrog task is depicted in
Figure 1A. In the Leapfrog task there are two actions, A and B,
with different payoffs. The participants’ task is to try to choose
the higher payoff option as often as possible (this proportion,not
total points,is the key metric). Option B’s payoff is initially higher
(at 20 points) than option A’s payoff (10 points). On each trial,
there is a ﬁxed probability, which we refer to as volatility, that the
inferior action increases its payoff by 20 points,“leapfrogging”the
other option to give higher payoff. In summary,jumps are subject
tothreeconstraints:theyoccurataﬁxedvolatilityunknowntothe
decision-maker, the two actions alternate in making jumps, and a
jump always increases an action’s point payoff by 20. Critically,
instructions make clear to participants that they will be rewarded
at the end of the experiment based on the proportion of“correct”
choices (i.e., choices for which the option with the higher true
payoff was chosen) as opposed total points earned. Jumps are not
explicitly made known to the decision-maker, but rather must be
inferred indirectly from observing choice payoffs.
Consistent with previous frameworks (Daw et al., 2006),
we deﬁne exploitation as choosing the action with the highest
observed payoff. A decision-maker must explore to detect when
the alternative action has leapfrogged over the action presently
being exploited. The Leapfrog task has only two actions, and all
possible underlying environment states can be mapped to the
number of unobserved jumps. For example, when there are no
unobserved jumps, the exploitative option still yields the higher
payoff. On the other hand, when there is one unobserved jump,
theexploratoryoptionhasthehigherpayoff.Consequently,unlike
previouslystudiedbandittasks,theprescriptionforoptimalchoice
behavior in the Leapfrog task is tractable,though non-trivial. Our
task also affords a straightforward manipulation of the rate at
whichdecision-makersshouldexplore.Namely,acrossconditions,
wevarythevolatilityof theenvironmenttoexaminewhethersub-
jects in low and high volatility conditions differ in their balance
of exploratory and exploitative choice. Intuitively and in accord
with the Ideal Actor, we expect that subjects should explore more
frequently in more volatile environments.
MODELS EVALUATED
A number of model variants are evaluated to shed light on human
choice behavior in the Leapfrog task. In addition to examining
whether choice is better described by reﬂexive versus reﬂective
strategies, the second main question we ask is whether people
plan ahead optimally, taking the value of the information gained
through exploration into account when acting, or myopically
choose the action expected to receive the larger reward,regardless
of the action’s impact on later reward. We compare human data
from the Leapfrog task to three models: a reﬂexive and myopic
model we term the “Naïve RL” model, which expects payoffs (or
rewards) to be as they were last experienced; a reﬂective and
myopic model we call the “Belief model,” which directly acts on
the basis of its beliefs about current payoffs; and a model that
plans optimally from reﬂective beliefs, the “Ideal Actor.” For full
algorithmic descriptions of the models we refer the reader to the
Appendix.
Both reﬂective models employ an“Ideal Observer,”which opti-
mally updates beliefs based on past actions and observed payoffs.
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FIGURE 1 | Choice behavior and model-inferred beliefs and values in
the Leapfrog bandit task. At each trial, there is a ﬁxed probability, which
we refer to as volatility or P(ﬂip), that the inferior action increases its
point payoff by 20 points. After the ﬁrst “jump,” Action A “pays” 30
points, superior to Action B’s 20 points. After this jump, Action B’s payoff
will increase by 20 points with the same probability. (A) An example
participant’s sequence of choices over 100 trials in an environment with
volatility rate P(ﬂip)=0.075.The two solid lines indicate the true payoffs
for each option, and the × and • marks indicate the participant’s choices
among these options. (B)The Ideal Observer’s belief that the exploitative
options will yield larger the higher payoff – and thus the higher
immediate reward – at each trial in the task instantiation at top. Note that
the subject’s certainty about the options’ relative payoffs generally
decreases during exploitation-only runs. (C)The relative long-term value
of the exploitative option at each trial as determined by the Ideal Actor,
using the beliefs from (B) and an optimal valuation function. Also note
that changes in the relative value follow changes in belief in a non-linear
fashion.
Figure 1B depicts beliefs as determined by the Ideal Observer for
the actions and observations in Figure1A. Similar Ideal Observer
models have been employed in task domains such as visual search
(Najemnik and Geisler, 2005) and prediction and change point
detection(SteyversandBrown,2005).Ofthetworeﬂectivemodels,
only the Ideal Actor builds upon its optimal beliefs by consid-
ering the effect of exploration on reducing uncertainty in its
future beliefs. Optimal beliefs about current payoffs and correct
assessments of each action’s informational value together yield a
numericexpressionof eachaction’soverallvalue–expressedasQ-
values – determining optimal choice behavior. The Ideal Actor’s
Q-values are calculated by converting the task to a POMDP and
solving it in this form. In Figure1C,the options’relative Q-values
areshownasafunctionof thebeliefsinFigure1Bandthenumber
of remaining trials.
Because people may act noisily, in all three models we make
choice a stochastic function of action values using the Softmax
choice rule (Sutton and Barto, 1998), parameterizing the extent
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to which the choice rule is sensitive to value differences using the
inversetemperatureparameter(henceforththe“Softmaxparame-
ter”). This constitutes the Naïve RL model’s only free parameter,
while the two reﬂective models have an additional parameter,
P(ﬂip),which represents the model’s estimate of the environment
volatility.
We rely on two complementary results to assess the belief-
directed nature of subjects’ choices in the Leapfrog task. First, we
deﬁne a hazard rate metric elucidating the increasing likelihood
of exploratory choice over time, for which reﬂective and reﬂex-
ive models make clear and divergent predictions. Second, these
qualitativeresultsinturnmotivatequantitativecomparisonof the
extent to which these models characterize human choice. To fore-
shadow, we ﬁnd that humans are best described by the reﬂective,
butmyopic,Belief model,suggestingthatexploratorychoiceisnot
necessarily directed by a planning process that takes into account
thevalueof futureinformationyieldedbyactions.Finally,weana-
lyze people’s choice latencies in terms of the Ideal Actor’s action
prescriptions, observing that people exhibit larger latencies when
theyactsuboptimally,demonstratingtheIdealActor’spotentialas
a tool for online, process-oriented analysis of exploratory choice
behavior.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SUBJECTS
A total of 139 undergraduates at the University of Texas partici-
pated in this experiment in exchange for course credit and a small
cash bonus tied to proportion of trials for which the higher pay-
off option was chosen. The sample from which our sample was
drawn is 54.3% female and 42.5% male, with 3.2% who declined
to report their gender. The ages of participants in this pool ranged
from18to55(M =19.08,SD=1.76).Participantswererandomly
assigned to three volatility level conditions, deﬁned by the prob-
ability at each trial that the payoff ordering of options would
ﬂip, P(ﬂip): low volatility [P(ﬂip)=0.025], medium volatility
[P(ﬂip)=0.075],andhighvolatility[P(ﬂip)=0.125].Therewere
51, 41, and 47 subjects in the low, middle, and high volatility
conditions respectively.
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE
The task instructions explained that one option was always
worth 10 more points than the other option, that the superi-
ority of the two options alternated over time, and that options
always changed values by 20 points. Subjects were informed
that their payment was tied to the number of times they
chose the higher payoff option. Additionally, they were told
at the outset which option, A or B, was initially superior at
the start of the experiment and that the experiment consisted
of 500 choices in total. The bandit task interface consisted of
two buttons on a computer screen marked “OPTION A” and
“OPTION B.”
Prior to the main bandit task, subjects completed a num-
ber of training trials intended to familiarize them with the
procedure and the volatility rate. In these training trials, par-
ticipants ﬁrst completed a passive viewing task in which they
viewed 500 trials of the bandit task whose payoffs were ran-
domly generated as previously described in the section on the
Leapfrog task. To focus subjects’ attention on the volatility
rather than the true payoffs in the volatility-training phase, the
payoffs for each option either read “SAME” or “CHANGED.”
Before each block of 100 trials, participants then provided an
estimate of the number of ﬂips they expected in the next
block.
Following training, participants completed 500 trials of the
mainbandittask.Oneachtrial,subjectssawtheword“CHOOSE”
and had 1.5s to make a choice using the using the“Z”or“?”keys
for the left and right options respectively. Following each choice,
numerical feedback was provided for 1s, indicating the number
of points that resulted from the choice.When a response deadline
was missed, the computer displayed the message “TOO SLOW”
accompanied by a large red X for 1s and the participant repeated
that trial. Payoffs for options A and B started at 10 and 20 respec-
tively and, as described above, alternated jumping by 20 points
with probability governed by P(ﬂip). An example instantiation
of the payoffs is depicted in Figure 1A along with an example
subjects’sequence of choices.
RESULTS
CHOICE BEHAVIOR
The primary dependent measure is whether subjects explored or
exploitedonatrial.Weclassiﬁedeachchoicemadebyaparticipant
as either exploratory or exploitative based on their experienced
payoffs up to that choice point: when the decision-maker chose
the option with the highest-seen payoffs, that choice was con-
sidered an exploitative choice, and when they chose the other
option, that was considered an exploratory choice (cf. Daw et al.,
2006).
Figure 2A depicts the hazard rates of subjects’ exploratory
choice across the three conditions, calculated as the probabil-
ity that an exploratory choice is made on trial t given that a
payoff jump was observed on trial t −n, restricted to a ﬁve-
trial window. In other words, this hazard rate is the probability
of making an exploratory choice as a function of the num-
ber of consecutive exploitative choices. These hazard rates are
calculated from 139 simulations – one for each subject in the
experiment – of each model allocated across the three volatil-
ity conditions. Each model was “yoked” to a subject’s particular
instantiation of the Leapfrog payoff structure and, consequently,
their environment volatility rate. To determine model choice
behavior, we used the average of participants’ best-ﬁtting para-
meter values for each volatility condition and model (see Table 1;
procedure described below). For each model, we calculated the
hazard rate of exploration in the same way as subjects and report
these rates in Figures 2B–D. It can be seen that subjects’ rate of
exploration increased monotonically over time, F(1,137)=5.96,
p <0.05, contrasting with the predictions of the purely reﬂexive
Naïve RL model but in accordance with the qualitative predic-
tions of the reﬂective Belief and Ideal Actor models. Further,
subjects in more volatile environments explored more frequently,
F(2,137)=31.50, p <0.001, which is an intuitive result as beliefs
about the relative expected payoffs of the options should change
more rapidly in more volatile environments. There was a signif-
icant interaction between volatility and run length of exploitive
trials, F(2,137)=4.47,p <0.001.
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FIGURE 2 | “Hazard rate of exploration” for participants (A) and the three
models under consideration (B–D), deﬁned as the probability of exploring
as a function of the number of consecutive exploitative choices after
observing a payoff jump.Thus, for example, n=4 refers to a situation where,
beginning with the observation of a jump, three exploitative choices are made
before an exploratory choice. Critically, the reﬂective nature of the Belief model
and the Ideal Actor results in a monotonically increasing hazard rate as the
models’ certainty about the relative optimality of the options decays over time.
MODEL FITS
Having speciﬁed the three models computationally, we deter-
mined which model(s) best characterized participants’ choices
across the three volatility conditions. We used maximum likeli-
hood estimation to ﬁnd the set of parameters that maximized the
likelihood of each model for each subject. To compare goodness
of ﬁt across models, we used the Bayesian information criterion
(BIC: Schwartz, 1978) as the models have differing numbers of
free parameters. Note that lower BIC values indicate better ﬁt.
Across all three conditions, subjects were best ﬁt by the Belief
model as judged by log-likelihood scores (see Figure3A). Though
theIdealActormodelﬁtworseoverall(seeFigure3B),itprovided
the best ﬁt for a considerable number of subjects. Very few sub-
jectswerebestﬁtbytheNaïveRLmodel.Theseresultssuggestthat
subjects’ exploration manifests a reﬂective belief-updating rather
than a reﬂexive process, but they do not appear to be optimally
using these beliefs to conduct long-term planning.
CHOICE LATENCY
We also hypothesized that choice latencies (as measured by RTs)
would provide an online assessment of a reﬂective and belief-
driven decision process. We intuited that RTs would be larger
insituationsinwhichparticipantsactedagainsttheirbeliefsabout
the currently optimal action – that is, people would exhibit larger
choice latencies when they made errors. Supporting this conjec-
ture and following the data pattern of most studies of speeded
choiceinwhichresponsebiasisminimal,leadingmodelsof choice
predict that errors are associated with larger response times than
are correct responses (cf. Ratcliff and Rouder, 1998). Accord-
ingly, we factorially examined exploratory and exploitative choice
RTs, classifying them as “explore optimal” or “exploit optimal,”
deﬁning the two bins based on the Ideal Actor’s choice prescrip-
tion. To ensure that any effects of choice RT observed were not
attributable to sequential effects such as response repetitions or
switches (Walton et al., 2004) – which may be confounded with
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Table 1 | Best-ﬁtting parameter values by model and condition.
Condition P(ﬂip) (SD) Softmax parameter (SD) Total BIC
NA¨ lVE RL
P(ﬂip) = 0.025 1.9 (0.04) 16365
P(ﬂip) = 0.075 1.4 (0.03) 16730
P(ﬂip) = 0.125 1.1 (0.03) 21134
BELIEF MODEL
P(ﬂip) = 0.025 0.046 (0.033) 3.87 (1.40) 14757
P(ﬂip) = 0.075 0.103 (0.059) 4.78 (2.02) 13668
P(ﬂip) = 0.125 0.134 (0.069) 4.90 (2.28) 16807
IDEALACTOR
P(ﬂip) = 0.025 0.01 (0.01) 0.58 (0.23) 16535
P(ﬂip) = 0.075 0.04 (0.05) 0.55 (0.23) 13995
P(ﬂip) = 0.125 0.07 (0.07) 0.59 (0.25) 16914
exploratory choices – we ﬁrst performed a regression to partial
out these effects. This model assumed that choice RTs were a
linear function of the response repetitions and switches (in rela-
tion to the present response) of the previous 10 trials. We then
performed the analysis of interest on the resultant residual RTs.
Figure 4 depicts the average median reconstructed RTs across the
three volatility conditions in the four unique situations described
above.
It is apparent that, in the medium [P(ﬂip)=0.075] and
high [P(ﬂip)=0.125] volatility conditions,participants exhibited
larger choice latencies when they acted against the prescription of
the Ideal Actor. A mixed-effects linear regression (Pinheiro and
Bates, 2000) conducted on these residual RTs (random effects
over subjects) revealed a signiﬁcant interaction between chosen
action (explore versus exploit, mirroring non-human primate
results reported by Pearson et al., 2009) and prescribed opti-
mal action (exploration-optimal versus exploitation-optimal),
β=−8.90,SE=3.41,p <0.01.A full list of regression coefﬁcients
a r ep r o v i d e di nTable 2. It is important to note that these effects
are prevalent even when explanations such as switch costs are
taken into consideration. These patterns did not appear to vary
signiﬁcantly with volatility condition, F =0.18,p =0.67.
MODEL PERFORMANCE
To examine the importance of optimal planning (as opposed to
myopic choice) in reﬂective belief models, we simulated deter-
ministic versions of the Ideal Actor and the Belief model on
10,000 independent instantiations of the Leapfrog task. Rather
than use a Softmax choice rule, these models act deterministi-
cally: the deterministic Ideal Actor always chooses the highest-
valued action and the deterministic Belief model always exploits
when the model’s belief that the exploitative option yields higher
payoff is greater than 0.5. Both models also employ optimal
belief-updating by the Ideal Observer, using the condition’s true
P(ﬂip) value. To examine how the addition of stochasticity might
improve the Belief model’s performance in this task, we simu-
lated a Softmax variant of the Belief model using the true P(ﬂip)
values and Softmax parameters that were optimized to give the
best performance. The results reported in Table 3 conﬁrm the
importance of planning in the Leapfrog task and the beneﬁt the
FIGURE 3 | Model goodness of ﬁt measures as a function of
model and volatility condition. (A)The proportion of participants
that were best ﬁt by each model in each condition. (B) Log-likelihood
ratios comparing the Ideal Actor and the Belief model. Negative
values indicate that participants were better described by the Belief
model.
Belief model derives from an element of stochastic (i.e., random)
choice.
DISCUSSION
We examined whether human decision-makers approach
exploratory choice in a reﬂective and belief-directed fashion as
opposed to a stochastic and undirected fashion. Using a novel
task that allowed for unambiguous identiﬁcation of the two can-
didate strategies, we found that decision-makers appeared to be
updating their beliefs about relative payoffs in a reﬂective man-
ner – including knowledge about possible unseen changes in the
task structure – but did not seem to be fully utilizing these beliefs
by planning ahead with assessments of the informational value of
actions. Indeed, for both subjects and reﬂective models, hazard
rates reveal that the probability of exploratory choice increases
with the number of immediately previous consecutive exploitive
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FIGURE 4 |Adjusted choice reaction times (RTs) across volatility
conditions as a function of choice type (exploratory versus exploitative)
and IdealActor choice prescription (exploit optimal versus explore
optimal). For example, the far right bars represent situations in which
participants explored when the Ideal Actor prescribed exploiting. Of note is
that across the medium [P(ﬂip)=0.075] and high [P(ﬂip)=0.125] volatility
conditions, participants exhibited larger RTs when they acted against the
prescription of the Ideal Actor. See main text for analysis details.
choices(seeFigure2).Thisqualityisnotpredictedbythereﬂexive
N a ï v eR Lm o d e l .
Given the reﬂexive and reﬂective models’ qualitatively differ-
ent predictions of sequential dependency, this comparison yields
a strong test for determining which type of belief-updating better
matches human behavior. Furthermore, our quantitative model
comparisonsrevealedthatthetworeﬂectivemodelsclearlyprovide
betterﬁtsthanthepurelyreﬂexiveNaïveRLmodel(seeFigure3A).
These results suggest that people do exhibit marked sequential
dependency and that their belief updates are reﬂective. Further,
these results give credence to previous usage of reﬂective mod-
els of human choice behavior in bandit tasks (Daw et al., 2006;
Boorman et al., 2009), which until now has not been empirically
justiﬁed.
A number of related contributions dovetail with our reﬂexive
versusreﬂectivedistinction.However,thetasksusedinthesestud-
iesdifferinimportantways.Recentworkhassoughttoidentifythe
contributionsof model-based(i.e.,reﬂective)andmodel-free(i.e.,
reﬂexive) strategies of choice in a multistep decision task (Daw et
al., 2011). However, model-based behavior in Daw et al.’s study
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Table 2 | Choice latency regression coefﬁcients.
Coefﬁcient Estimate (SE) p-Value
Volatility −367 .13 (185.93) 0.054
Choice type 5.96 (3.74) 0.1
Optimal choice 3.14 (4.26) 0.24
Volatility×choice type 0.06 (42.21) 0.76
Volatility×prescribed choice 35.06 (48.17) 0.4
Choice type×optimal choice −8.87 (3.42) 0.006
Volatility×choice type×prescribed choice 7 .89 (37 .99) 0.71
Table 3 | Choice performance relative to deterministic IdealActor.
Condition Deterministic Belief model Stochastic Belief model
P(ﬂip)=0.025 0.854 0.988
P(ﬂip)=0.075 0.943 0.978
P(ﬂip)=0.125 0.946 0.954
did not entail updating beliefs about option payoffs across trials
as uncertainty grew. Instead,a forward model of the environment
was used to prospectively evaluate option values in accordance
with the environment’s transition structure. Related, B i e l ee ta l .
(2009)foundthatamodelprescribinguseofhigher-levelstrategies
in a series of exploration–exploitation problems better predicted
the patterns of sequential dependency in human behavior than
a naïve sampling model that shared qualities with the Naïve RL
model presented here
Critically, participants’ differing levels of exploration across
conditions could not be explained by the stochasticity with which
they made choices: the best-ﬁtting Softmax parameters did not
decrease with environment volatility in either of the two models.
Rather, the differences in rates of exploratory choice appear to be
accounted for by the best-ﬁtting P(ﬂip) rates.
Notably, we also found that when decision-makers in medium
and high volatility environments made sub-optimal decisions
(insofar as the choices did not accord with the Ideal Actor’s pre-
scription), they exhibited larger choice RTs compared to when
theymadeoptimalchoices.SincetheIdealActor’schoiceprescrip-
tions are a function of subjects’inferred trial-by-trial beliefs,these
choice RTs provide another window into the belief-directed and
reﬂective nature of their choices. Indeed, previous experimental
work revealed that decision-makers exhibit greater choice latency
when choosing options that will result in increased cognitive costs
(Botvinick and Rosen, 2009) or when perceived logical conﬂict –
and thus, the potential for making erroneous responses – is high
(De Neys and Glumicic, 2008).
Quantitative comparison of the two reﬂective models – the
Belief model and the Ideal Actor – favors the Belief model as a
characterization of human choice behavior. Both models employ
an Ideal Observer to maintain optimal beliefs about the expecta-
tion of immediate reward. However,the IdealActor also considers
how an exploitative or exploratory action would inform its beliefs
and precisely calculates the expected beneﬁt of this information
on future reward. Adding this value of information to the Ideal
Observer’s expectation of immediate reward, as the Ideal Actor
does,decreasesthemodel’sabilitytoﬁtparticipants’choicebehav-
ior(showninFigure3B).Thus,itappearsthatpeopledonotfully
utilize these beliefs in a forward-planning way but, rather, appear
tousethebeliefsinamyopicfashion,inaccordancewiththeBelief
model.
In addition to providing a qualitative characterization of the
structure of human exploratory choice, this paper contributes
two tools for the study of exploratory decision-making. First, we
present a task that allows us to disentangle reﬂective and belief-
directed exploration from stochastic and undirected exploration,
a feature absent in previous tasks used to examine exploratory
choice (Worthy et al., 2007; Jepma and Nieuwenhuis, 2011). Fur-
ther, the task is also sufﬁciently constrained to prescribe a sta-
tistically optimal pattern of choice, yielding the Ideal Actor. In
turn, this model’s belief-updating mechanism provides powerful
toolsforcharacterizinghumanchoicebehaviorinthistask,andits
choice prescriptions afford the revelation of nuanced patterns of
choicelatenciesthatwouldbeundetectablewithoutsuchamodel.
These formal models offer new ways of understanding what
exploration is. The deﬁnition of exploratory choice depends on
how one views the relationship between the actor and the struc-
ture of the environment or, even more abstractly, the relation-
ship between the action and the hierarchical structure of the
actor (Levinthal and March, 1993). In this paper, we deﬁne the
exploitative action as a choice of the option that has yielded the
highest-experiencedpayoff uptothetimeof choice.Analternative
trial classiﬁcation scheme could deﬁne an exploitative action as a
choice of the option believed – according to a speciﬁc model –
to give the highest payoff at the time of choice. However, we
chose our deﬁnition because it avoids commitment to a particular
model of choice; a choice is exploitative or exploratory regardless
of any model under consideration. Under the alternative deﬁn-
ition, exploration in our models could only arise from a purely
stochastic process.
Simulations of the Ideal Actor and Belief model suggest an
intriguing hypothesis, namely that stochastic behavior may be an
adaptation to cognitive capacity limitations in long-range plan-
ning. As detailed in Table 3, performance of the Belief model
(which does not plan) approaches that of the Ideal Actor (which
does plan optimally) when stochasticity is incorporated into the
Belief model’s action selection. Consequently, we hypothesize
that stochasticity in human decision-making may arise from a
sub-optimalvaluationprocess;theknowledgegainedfrompoten-
tial exploration is not explicitly incorporated in valuation but is
still obtained by random behavior. This hypothesis warrants fur-
ther investigation through tasks and models that afford requisite
discrimination.
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APPENDIX
THE LEAPFROG TASK
Here we give a more technical description of the Leapfrog task,
using the framework of reinforcement learning (RL). We then
brieﬂy introduce partially observable Markov decision processes
(POMDPs) and map the Leapfrog task to a highly compacted
POMDP task, which we use in the following section to formu-
late the Ideal Observer, the belief-maintaining component of our
reﬂective models,and the Ideal Actor itself.
We now describe the Leapfrog task more formally within the
RL framework. Our task consists of two actions,A and B,two cor-
responding state variables, sa or sb, and reward is 1 for one action
and 0 for the other. Given an action X, the reward is 1 if sX >sY
and 0 otherwise. sa =10 and sb =20 when the task starts. At each
trial,thereisaﬁxedprobabilitythatthelowersa andsb increasesby
20,switching the two actions’rewards and,consequentially,which
action is optimal (thus the name Leapfrog). We call this probabil-
ityvolatility or P(ﬂip).Tocreateuncertaintythatpropagatesfrom
trialtotrial–thusmotivatingexploration–theagentisnotshown
its reward. Rather, the agent only observes the value of the state
variable that is tied to its action, sa or sb. The beneﬁt of showing
only sa or sb is that the lower-valued state variable can “jump” by
20 points and the agent will not know that the optimal actions are
switched until it explores.
Thetaskhasaﬁnitehorizon(i.e.,asetnumberof trials),andan
agent’s performance is evaluated by how much reward it accumu-
lates.Notethat,becauseof thelimitedobservabilityandstochastic
nature of the task, no decision-maker can guarantee to always
choose the correct action. Therefore the Ideal Actor, in addition
to its use as a model of the human, provides an upper bound on
expected performance that facilitates assessment of how well peo-
ple perform with various volatilities (and consequently, various
difﬁculty levels).
Partially observable Markov decision processes
If the dynamics of a task are determined by a Markov decision
process(seeSuttonandBarto,1998;foranintroductiontoMDPs),
but the state cannot be directly observed by the agent – as is the
case with the Leapfrog task – the task can often be modeled as a
partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP).
To illustrate, consider a navigation task through a maze with
a known map. When the decision-maker knows its exact location
state at any time (e.g., via GPS), the task maps naturally to an
MDP. On the other hand, a decision-maker without such global
knowledge must use local features, such as corridors and corners,
to localize itself. In this case, more than one location could share
the same local features, and the decision-maker must use these
observations along with its knowledge of recent movements and
previousestimatesoflocationtoprobabilisticallyestimateitsloca-
tion. In this case, the task maps well to a POMDP, as Stankiewicz
et al. (2006) did for a similar navigation task.
More formally, a POMDP is deﬁned by the set of variables {S,
A,T,R,Ω,O}( Kaelbling et al.,1998). S and A are respectively the
sets of states and actions. Given an action at and a current state st
attimet,thestatetransitionstost+1 attimet+1withprobability
T(st, at, st+1) [i.e., P(st+1 |st, at)]. At each time step, the agent
also receives a real-valued reward, r =R(s, a), and an observation
O from the set Ω of possible observations. The probability of an
observation ot can be modeled equivalently as either O(at +1, st,
ot)orO(at,s t,ot)(Kaelblingetal.,1998).Intheundiscountedcase
suchastheLeapfrogtask,anagent’sgoalinaPOMDPistochoose
actions that maximize return,deﬁned as E [
∞
t=0 rt].
Within a POMDP, optimal actions are determined not only by
expectations of immediate reward and transitions to next states
(as in MDPs), but also by the value of knowledge that actions
yield. Therefore, an optimal action can have the sole purpose of
gathering information about the true state. Note that a POMDP
is a formal description of a task and is separate from a model of
choice within the task.
Specifying the Leapfrog task as a three-state POMDP
As described, the leapfrog task can be speciﬁed as a POMDP with
twostatevariables;sA andsB canrespectivelytakevaluesin{10,30,
...,10+10n}and{20,40,...,20+(10n)},wheren isthenumber
of trials.
However,wecanspecifythetaskmuchmorecompactly,reduc-
ing the belief space to three dimensions (one per state) from the
n2 dimensions it would otherwise have,making the Leapfrog task
tractable to solve exactly. To justify this more compact representa-
t i o n ,w eﬁ r s tl e tsH be the action-tied state variable (sA or sB) with
the Highest observed number, which we call oH, and s¬H be the
otheraction-tiedstatevariable;H and¬H aretheircorresponding
actions. Thus H frequently changes its mapping between the two
possibleactionsinthetask.Consequently,accordingtothedeﬁni-
tionsinthemaintext,choosingH wouldconstituteanexploitative
choice and choosing ¬H would constitute an exploratory choice.
At any trial, the agent knows the minimal states for (sH, s¬H)a r e
(oH,oH −10),based on the leapfrogging nature of the task.
ForatrialwithoH,therearethreepossibleaction-tiedstatepairs
(sH, s¬H). The pairs (oH, oH −10) and (oH, oH +10) occur when
therearezeroandoneunobservedjumps,respectively.Whenthere
aretwounobservedjumps,resultinginthepair(oH +20,oH +10),
theagentisguaranteedtoobserveatleastonejumpregardlessofits
action.Sincethereisatmostonenewjumppertrial,thisguarantee
of observing a jump makes it impossible to have more than two
unobserved jumps. Note that action H (i.e., exploiting) receives a
reward of 1 only when there are zero or two unobserved jumps.
Therefore, the three possible states of our compacted POMDP
are 0, 1, or 2 unobserved jumps. Additionally, a belief within this
compacted POMDP is a vector of the probabilities that there are
0, 1, or 2 jumps, which necessarily sum to 1. Following this, the
compactedobservationsarethenumberof previouslyunobserved
jumpsseeninatrial(0,1,or2),wherepayoffsoH −10andoH yield
the same observation of 0 previously unseen jumps. In summary,
the compacted POMDP has three states, three observations, two
actions, and two possible rewards values.
MODELS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE IDEAL OBSERVER
Thissectiongivesafulltechnicaldescriptionof theIdealObserver,
which optimally maintains a distribution over possible state, and
the Ideal Actor, the model that reﬂectively incorporates optimal
beliefs along with an exact assessment of the information-based
value of actions. On the explicative path to the Ideal Actor, we
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commentontheothertwomodelsof humanbehaviorusedinour
evaluations, Naïve RL and Belief.
All models choose options based on a Softmax choice rule that
takes a model’s valuation of each action as input. The probability
of choosing option A at time t with payoff belief bt,i s
Pt (A) =
eγQt(bt,A)
eγQt(bt,A) + eγQt(bt,B).
Here, Qt(bt, ·) is the model’s assessed value of option A or B,
and γ is the Softmax inverse temperature parameter, the deter-
mination of which is described in the Model Fits section of this
paper’s body.
Naïve RL model
The simplest model reﬂexively maintains beliefs about payoffs
basedonlyonwhatithasseen.Inotherwords,itbelievesthepoint
payoffsforeachactionarethosemostrecentlyobserved.Therefore,
the Naïve RL model assumes that action H and ¬H respectively
give rewards of 1 and 0. Its expectation of each action’s reward,
Q(·), is input into a Softmax action selector, giving it a constant
probability of exploring or exploiting:
P (H) =
exp [γQ (H)]
exp [γQ (H)] + exp [γQ (¬H)]
=
exp [γ]
exp [γ] + 1
.
Here, γ is the Softmax inverse temperature parameter. In Soft-
max action selection, as this parameter rises, the probability that
the highest-valued action (i.e., the greedy action) will be cho-
sen increases. When the Softmax parameter approaches inﬁnity,
actions become deterministically greedy; at zero, the parameter
creates uniformly random action selection. As mentioned in the
main text, the Naïve RL model is equivalent to a memory-based
RL agent, with a memory size of one, which is appropriate given
the deterministic nature of the payoffs and that payoffs never
return to previous values; a larger memory would not yield useful
information for a reﬂexive model performing the Leapfrog task.
Algorithmically, this model is equivalent to the Softmax model
used inWorthy et al. (2007) and Otto et al. (2010),with a learning
rate of 1.
Ideal Observer
An Ideal Observer uses past actions and observations optimally
to update its belief distribution over the set of states. The Ideal
Observer–agnostictoactionselection–isusedasacomponentof
the belief and Ideal Actor models described below, providing cor-
rectbeliefsateachtimestep.BecausePOMPDsbydeﬁnitionsatisfy
the Markov property (Kaelbling et al.,1998),belief updates can be
performed with only the past belief, the last action, and the last
observation, given knowledge of the observation and transition
functions. In other words, the Ideal Observer can dispense with
the remainder of its history of actions, beliefs, and observations.
Below, we show the derivation of our optimal Bayesian belief-
updating procedure, which is speciﬁc to the case of POMDPs
where observation ot is a function of st and at, not the more typ-
ical st and at−1,1 since the number of unobserved jumps and the
action determine the number of newly observed jumps. The ﬁnal
lineofthisderivation,afunctionofknowndistributions,isusedto
calculatethenextstatebelief.Inthisnotation,weputat andbt after
a“;”because they are ﬁxed and known and are thus considered to
parameterize the probability distributions.
P (st+1 = i|ot;at,bt) =
P (st+1 = i|ot;at,bt)
P (ot;at,bt)
P (st+1 = i|ot;at,bt) ∝ P (st+1 = i,ot;at,bt)
bt+1 (i) ∝ P (st+1 = i,ot;at,bt)
bt+1 (i) ∝

j
P

st+1 = i,ot,st = j;at,bt

bt+1 (i) ∝

j
P

ot|st+1 = i,st = j;at

P

st+1 = i,st = j;at,bt


ot is cond. indep. of st+1 given st

bt+1 (i) ∝

j
P

ot|st =j;at

P

st+1 =i |st =j;at

P

st =j;bt

bt+1 (i) ∝

j
P

ot|st = j;at

P

st+1 = i|st = j;at

bt

j

Belief model
We can easily specify a model that values actions by their
expected immediate rewards according to the Ideal Observer,
creatingamoresophisticatedactionselectiontechniquethansim-
ply always choosing H. More precisely, this more sophisticated
Belief model is more likely to choose action H than ¬H when
bt+1(0)+bt+1(2)>0.5 – that is, when it believes that there are
probably0or2unobservedjumpsandthuslyactionH isexpected
to yield the higher immediate reward.
If the Belief model chooses the action deterministically, the
model is optimal with respect to maximizing immediate reward.
However, this model would not be fully optimal in the long-term
because its choices fail to take into account the informational
beneﬁt of each action.
Ideal Actor model
An Ideal Actor uses beliefs reﬂectively provided by its Ideal
Observer component to consider expected immediate reward,
but it also evaluates an action’s effect on its longer-term expec-
tation of return caused by the change in its belief distribution.
In other words, the Ideal Actor sometimes chooses actions with
lower immediate rewards to increase its knowledge about the
true state, facilitating more informed decisions in future trials.
To implement the Ideal Actor, we employed the Incremental
Pruning algorithm (using the POMDP-Solve library, Cassandra
et al., 1997), an exact inference method that calculates action-
value functions (i.e., Q-functions) for each time horizon (i.e.,
1By our subscripting, ot occurs after st is set, immediately after at, and before st+1.
This ordering is because the action is a causal factor of the observation, and the
observation intuitively comes before the probabilistic jump that ﬁnally determines
st+1. However, calling the observation ot+1 is an appropriate alternative.
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number of trials remaining).2 We used the implementation of
IncrementalPruningfromthePOMDP-Solvelibrary.Thisaction-
value function Qt,w h e r et is the horizon, takes as input a belief
bt and an action H or ¬H and outputs a real-number value.
The belief vector input to Qt comes from the Ideal Observer’s
belief, making the Ideal Actor a reﬂective model. If acting opti-
mally, the Ideal Actor deterministically chooses argmaxa Qt(bt,
a), where a ∈{H, ¬H}. Unlike other actor models examined
in this paper and in previous work, the Ideal Actor chooses
actions based on both its belief about the immediate reward
and the expected beneﬁt from the knowledge gained by choos-
ing each action. Figure 1A illustrates the trial-by-trial relative
Q-values – that is, Qt(bt, H)–Qt(bt, ¬H)–w h i c ha r ea
function of the Ideal Observer’s trial-by-trial belief (shown in
Figure 1B).
2The time horizon affects the optimal action for a given belief vector because the
value of knowledge changes as the ﬁnal trial approaches.
MODEL-FITTING PROCEDURE
For each model, we sought parameter estimates that maximized
the likelihood of each participant’s observed choices given their
previous history of choices and outcomes:
Lmodel =

t
Pc,t
where c,t reﬂects the choice made on trial t and Pc,t is the proba-
bility of the model choosing c,t, informed by participant’s choice
and payoff experience up to trial t. We conducted an exhaustive
grid search to optimize parameter values for each participant. To
compare models, we utilized the Bayesian information criterion
(BIC: Schwartz, 1978),which is calculated by
BICmodel =− 2 × 1n(Lmodel) + kmodel · 1n(n)
where k is the model’s number of free parameters and n is the
number of trials being ﬁt (500 in all cases).
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